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Warfighting First? Not So Much

SecAF Wilson: Mattis' Departure Made it Easier for Me to Resign

5 Things You Didn’t Know About ‘Black Hawk Down’

Joseph Allen “Joey” Ashley Memorial Highway

Warfighting First? Not So Much


By Ensign Michael McKinney, U.S. Navy | May 2019 | Proceedings | Vol. 145/5/1,395

The Naval Academy is a great college, but it doesn't prepare future warfighters for their professional responsibilities.



My shipmates from the U.S. Naval Academy class of 2018 are starting to hit the fleet. The SWOs have completed Basic Division Officers Course and maybe even a deployment. Aviators are in the middle of flight school, about to learn their platform assignments. Submariners are in the middle of their studies in Charleston, and most of the Marines have completed their toils in Quantico. Yet they arrived at these places having learned next to nothing about modern naval warfare from their Naval Academy educations.

Most of the class successfully completed the Naval Academy program without giving any structured thought to what happens if they encounter a hostile ship, submarine, or aircraft that is trying to kill them. The Naval Academy does not teach warfighting, but—in an era of renewed great power competition—it should. Midshipmen should leave the Naval Academy with a basic appreciation of what it looks like if the United States must fight on the seas or from the sea. They should understand how the various elements of the Navy–Marine Corps team work together to win our nation’s wars. The class of 2018 eventually will learn tactical prowess in their training pipelines, but devoting no thought to naval warfighting during the formative years in Annapolis seems like a lost opportunity at best and a disservice at worst.

The academic program is robust. The class of 2018 prepared for the highly technical nature of their profession in mandatory science and engineering classes. It prepared to think critically in humanities and leadership courses. It learned the basics of maritime skill in navigation and tested its mettle in leadership within Bancroft Hall. Yet, this was never synthesized into an understanding of what all this might mean in combat.

No other profession trains like this. Of course, while doctors and lawyers will tell you the best way to learn their craft is to stand in front of an actual jury or hold the scalpel in an operating room, classroom professional education specifically prepared them to do so. Some might say that a budding naval officer has a responsibility to learn about warfighting on his or her own—that a midshipman should read about this on his or her own time. But to relegate the central function of our military profession to an extracurricular activity or a reading hobby is not the right answer.

This argument does not advocate turning the Naval Academy into an Ender’s Game–style battle school. The college-like experience at the Naval Academy certainly has value, giving midshipmen the opportunity to study and excel in areas of their own interest while mandating a certain level of commonality in the humanities and engineering curricula. Nor does this argument take a side in the frequent humanities-versus-engineering debate. A renewed emphasis on warfighting requires both a basic technical understanding of naval systems and an appreciation of the human elements of war.

The first objection to an argument for more warfighting emphasis is that the plebe professional knowledge program (“pro-know”) and the midshipmen qualification standards (MQS) cover this. These programs, carried out within Bancroft Hall rather than the academic wing of the Naval Academy, have the goal of familiarizing midshipmen with their naval profession. The reality, however, is the programs for upperclass midshipmen are largely done without seriousness of purpose. The program is run by midshipmen, so from a teaching warfighting perspective, it is the blind leading the blind. The value of pro-know and MQS lies more in the management and leadership challenges associated with running the program than the actual knowledge itself.

It has not always been this way. The Naval Academy used to place a greater emphasis on this critical aspect of our profession. In the Cold War years, first-year midshipmen were required to learn about Soviet platforms in their pro-know. Today, that knowledge requirement only extends to U.S. platforms and is only as deep as identifying a guided-missile destroyer or a P-8 aircraft and not the role either platform plays in naval combat. Going back even further to the early 1900s, midshipmen competed for recognition in warfighting skill in areas such as gunnery, attested to by gunnery award plaques in academic hallways that have not been updated in decades.

One reason for the deemphasis of warfighting is historical. The U.S. Navy has not fought a major naval campaign since Leyte Gulf, and has not had a major maritime adversary since the Cold War. The Navy did cripple the Iranian Navy during the Operation Earnest Will tanker wars in a matter of hours, but that scenario is hardly an example of what maritime conflict with Russia or China might look like. Yet, even that fight is not studied in the core curriculum at the Naval Academy. U.S. battles since then primarily have been counterinsurgency operations, where the Department of the Navy’s primary contributions have been special operations forces, Marines, and naval aviation operating in uncontested airspace. The midcareer officers who teach at the Naval Academy come with these experiences, and that affects midshipmen’s thinking about modern warfare—mostly that it occurs in the desert against irregular forces.

For surface warfare officers (SWOs), the recent reemphasis on shiphandling and navigational safety, while certainly warranted, works against the goal of creating officers who understand modern naval warfare. If the emphasis in the senior year SWO practicum course is to be taken as a cue, the class of 2018 SWO ensigns left the Naval Academy thinking that the most dangerous thing to their ship on the ocean is an unarmed merchant ship or an immobile reef.

This could not be more wrong. Safe navigation of the ship represents the bare minimum of SWO professional competency. A SWO who only knows how to safely navigate a ship is not a surface warfare officer. It is not enough that a doctor knows anatomy or a lawyer, the law; each must be able to use that knowledge to accomplish their goals. That process starts with their education and is honed in their initial training. This is no less true for naval officers.

An officer’s community-specific training addresses this, but later. The Naval Academy should emphasize warfighting much earlier in officers’ careers in a number of ways.

First, study the Falkland Islands conflict. It is the best instance of relatively modern naval combat available, and it has everything: surface ships, naval aviation, subsurface warfare, and amphibious operations. The Academy should regularly invite participants of that conflict to speak about their experiences. In the plebe summer indoctrination program, Nate Fick is a regular speaker to the incoming classes, and his presentation on physical courage based on his time as a Marine platoon commander is excellent. Yet his experiences are only directly relatable to the quarter or so of the class that will commission in the Marine Corps. British SWOs, aviators, submariners, and Marines all participated in the Falklands War, and each of their experiences is valuable to midshipmen today.

Second, the Naval Academy is very fortunate to have the Naval Institute on its grounds, and the partnerships that already exist between the institute and the Academy are extremely valuable. But even more could be done. In 2015, the Naval Institute and the Naval Academy Museum hosted a debate between Dr. Jerry Hendrix and Bryan McGrath on the future of aircraft carriers. Another great event brought together the commanding officers of the USS Cole (DDG-67) and the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) to talk about their experiences leading their crews through extremely difficult damage control. Similar events about the future of the force or leadership under fire outside of the Marine Corps should happen more frequently to connect midshipmen to the warfighting service that they will eventually enter.

Third, the leadership curriculum at the Naval Academy should be modified to reflect one of the few things we do know about modern warfare: its extreme ambiguity. The fog of war is an enduring characteristic of warfare, but our enemies today make ambiguity a central part of their strategies. Russian troops did not enter Crimea wearing or carrying their flags, and China employs a vast maritime militia in the South China Sea to blur the lines between combatant and noncombatant. Academy ethics courses do a good job of focusing on the morally challenging situations that arise in warfare, but many of the examples derive from our decade and a half in the desert. It would require only a little imagination to update these scenarios for future conventional warfighting. More important, the leadership courses should include modules on how leaders make decisions in situations of ambiguous and incomplete information.

Finally, the Naval Academy could make better use of its Saturdays for training opportunities. As much as it pains this Annapolis graduate to admit, West Point does a much better job at this, with cadets regularly embarking on field exercises to practice leadership and learn basic military skills. These should serve as a model. There are only two mandatory events on Saturdays for midshipmen at present: home football games, and a trip to the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington for the plebe class. The Naval Academy could employ wargaming software such as “Harpoon” or “Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations” to teach midshipmen what it looks like when two naval forces meet in battle, and then have them apply those lessons against one another. This kind of thing used to be a required course at the Academy, taught during the summer, but wargaming could easily be taught on Saturdays. A low-impact way to implement this—if the football schedule really is sacrosanct—would be to take a battalion (one-sixth of the Brigade) at a time out of the football games to wargame. If the Academy were to place an even higher emphasis on war gaming than football games, more opportunities could open up.

A renewed emphasis on warfighting at the Naval Academy does not need to be a total retooling of midshipmen education. One major hurdle is already being overcome with the construction of Hopper Hall, which will house secret-clearance-level spaces and computer terminals. This will give midshipmen better access to some of the technical details involved in warfighting. The aim of this renewed emphasis would not be to graduate midshipmen who are masters at the tactical and operational level of war. The goal would be to graduate midshipmen who appreciate the complexities associated with modern naval warfare. This will also help them make better-informed decisions about their service selections and give them perspective during their follow-on training. Naval officers should be conversant in the basics of warfighting when they commission, and this should be a structured part of the Naval Academy’s educational program. 



SecAF Wilson: Mattis' Departure Made it Easier for Me to Resign

ABOARD A C-37 MILITARY AIRCRAFT -- When Air Force Secretary Heather Wilson was asked by then-Defense Secretary Jim Mattis to step up to the plate and become the 24th secretary for the service, she knew she was in good hands.

Wilson said she regards Mattis as "a pretty amazing leader," one who mentored her and shepherded her through the halls of the Pentagon.

"He was the one who asked me to come. And he's a pretty special guy to work for," she said during an exclusive interview with on Tuesday.

So when the University of Texas approached Wilson with a job offer around the same time as Mattis' departure-turned-ouster in December, her decision wasn't difficult to make.

"It made it easier for the University of Texas to recruit me, yes," she said. traveled with the outgoing secretary on one of her last trips to Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, before she departs the Pentagon in the next two weeks to take her new position as president of the University of Texas El Paso.

During her visit to Maxwell, Wilson continued to tout the latest National Defense Strategy -- another doctrine championed by Mattis -- one she says is "meatier than most." She had seen others while working on the White House National Security Council staff as director for defense policy and arms control for President George H.W. Bush during the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. She also served as a Republican in Congress from 1998 to 2009, representing New Mexico's 1st Congressional District.

But the Pentagon cannot stop with the NDS to go beyond 21st-century warfare. While the NDS is a blueprint on how to approach near-peer threats, Wilson said there's a lot of work to do in how the U.S. approaches current or rising conflicts and unconventional means of warfare. And in how it values its allies.

"I think we're not very good about gray-zone conflict," she said when asked what rising threats the Pentagon will need to work on more efficiently.

"Gray zone" conflict is often defined as an actor that wishes to gain advantage without provoking a conventional military response from its opponent. "Influence operations, or operations short of warfare itself, and undermining other governments' confidence in our alliances … conflict below the level of outright hostilities," Wilson explained.

"Information operations is an example to undermine regimes," she said. "Russia and China are better at that than we are because we just don't think that way."

The issue has come up during war games with top leadership, Wilson said.

In the real world, both Russia and China tailor their messaging or create disinformation campaigns to gain influence, which has allowed Russia to annex Crimea, for example, and China to increase its foothold in Venezuela.

"Our adversaries are often better at shaping the perception of what's going on than we are," Wilson said. But there's no magic answer, she added. "It's not an Air Force specialty, but it is something we need to think about because, in some conflicts, if you can create a fait accompli and the perception that you were the aggrieved party in the first place, and you're just writing the situation. The fait accompli can stick. It is the shaping of an information environment prior to conflict where I'm just not as sure we're as good as our adversaries."

Wilson spoke at length about a number of other topics, from what her successor must see through to how the Air Force might need to take greater -- or fewer -- risks. Her comments have been edited for clarity and brevity.

Q: Since the day Mattis asked you to be Air Force secretary, how has your outlook changed on the Air Force, U.S. national security and overall worldview after sitting in a top Pentagon position?

A: I think I've learned a lot about how the Pentagon operates and sometimes doesn't operate very well. But really, how the budgets are constructed. Even the way in which the Air Force and the other services look at warfighting. Strategies and concepts of operation, and how that flows into decision making about the budget. I also have a tremendous confidence in the leadership of the Air Force. When I was a captain, I saw a lot of general officers and thought, 'Bleh. I don't want to be like that guy.' Obviously, I have a different perspective now. I think that 28 years of continuous combat has weeded out riffraff. This is a pretty amazing group of general officers, leaders and senior NCOs that I think we're blessed to have.

Q: Reflecting on your time as secretary, what do you feel remains unfinished in the service?

A: I always have a long list of to-dos. I think I will die with a list to-dos on the fridge. We need to implement the Science and Technology Strategy. We have a number of things on ... personnel changes … such as officer performance reports that will be coming next year. Of course, we have a plan to implement the Space Force, pending legislation. I've spent a lot more time on budgets, a lot more time on space, than I anticipated coming into this job, but it needed the attention. And a significant shift in space to a contested domain. Those are big things.

Q: What do you believe your successor will need to tackle?

A: One of the lines of effort for the National Defense Strategy [is] deepening partnerships and keeping alliances. Also, getting readiness moving in the right direction. I'm about to sign our sustainment strategy into effect. Cost-effective modernization and getting acquisition reform implemented. The installation strategy. So we've got a lot of things that are either going or are well underway of being implemented. But one area that my successor is going to have to spend more time strategically is, 'Which of the partnerships and alliances do we need to attend to, what are the seeds we need to plant in order to be where [we need to be] 10 years from now?' I think that's going to be an important piece of work.

Q: That is fostering alliances, creating new ones, or all of the above?

A: All of the above. And what does it look like 10 years from now with a robust set of alliances for interoperability, for our allies' capacity to defend themselves, and for their relationships with each other? So that their regions of the world are more secure, more stable because we are facilitating robust alliances.

Q: The Air Force has touted how it's been able to move much faster the last few years in acquisition strategy, technology advancement and certain training it does across the force. Are there areas where the service may be talking about moving more quickly, but programs have yet to catch up?

A: Perhaps you were in the room when I said this [earlier], but I'm the one that's decisive and [Chief of Staff Gen. David] Goldfein sometimes tells me I need to slow down a little bit. And it's not necessarily on innovation, but we're trying to fix a lot problems in the personnel system. We've done a lot of things to try to fix professional military education and high-year tenure, the promotion recommendation form. And all of it has been based on really good analysis. But there's also a culturation tie-in. And particularly in things that make a lot of difference to people's professional lives, like going to more categories for promotion. ... It does matter a lot. I was ready to sign off on [some of these] new directives in the next couple weeks, and [Goldfein] convinced me that [we should] get this out to the force and get their feedback. Let them ask the questions. So that when we do roll it out, more people understand it. And we may modify it a bit based on that feedback. That's an example of maybe we should take more time to make sure that this will work. On [innovation and technology], there are times where an experiment doesn't work, and that's why you call them experiments. We had a program … where we had a company that thought it could really accelerate a technology, and we put it into an 804 [rapid acquisition] program, but we thought there was higher technical risk than the contractor did. We said, 'OK, if you think you can do this we'll … risk share with you.' But it got down to the final negotiations, and the [company] didn't want to risk share, which told us our assessment was probably right. So we backed off. ... And that's good judgment. We should celebrate that with our program managers for saying this is probably not mature. … We're better off acknowledging that now.

Q: Will the American public see a new technological advancement, weapon or aircraft in the next five years -- something we've never heard of before, something you know about but we do not?

A: Yes.

Q: Will it be really cool?

A: Yes. Because if that weren't true, you should be really disappointed in us. Because we're in a field where things are rapidly innovating. I remember where I was when I saw the first-ever iPhone. I was standing on the floor of the House of Representatives [in 2007]. That was over a decade ago. We take this for granted. If we weren't moving forward in innovating rapidly, then shame on us; you should be disappointed.

Q: Are Russia and China making these advancements faster than the U.S. is, and how concerning is that?

A: Russia is a declining petropower armed with nuclear weapons and a threat to its neighbors. China is innovating really quickly, and stealing things too. The threat we worry about most long-term is China.

Q: What is the long-term threat to U.S. national security, whether it be a nation or a type of adversarial action or advancement?

A: I think the rapid innovation of China and its determination to, by the middle of this century, have … a military that is reflective of its position [in the world] and whether China is able to develop as an economic national security power while still being a repressive regime internally … [makes] China the most interesting country to be watching for the next decade.

Q: What will you miss most as you vacate this position?

A: I'll miss the airmen, and the opportunity to interact with them. That's probably not an unexpected answer. I enjoy the fellowship. I've done a lot of different executive leadership jobs, and I've worked with a lot of great leaders. I've worked for the first President Bush, I've worked for Gen. [Brent] Scowcroft. I've worked for Bob Gates. Condoleezza Rice was a peer on the National Security Council staff. I've had a lot of great leaders and mentors, and people that I've watched up close as leaders. But I have never had as positive a working relationship as I have with another leader as I have with [Chief of Staff Gen.] Dave Goldfein. He is exceptional. And I will really miss that. 




5 Things You Didn’t Know About ‘Black Hawk Down’


14 May 2019 |


The classic war movie about the 1993 Battle of Mogadishu has just been remastered for 4K and released on Digital and 4K UHD disc. We spoke with both Eric Bana, the actor who plays Hoot, and Mark Bowden, the journalist who wrote the original book, and learned a few things about the movie and the real-life events that inspired it.

1. America didn't see it coming

In 1993, the Soviet Union had collapsed, and the United States won the first Gulf War in a cakewalk. The country (rightfully) saw itself as the world's last great military power, and there was a sense of invulnerability that was shattered by the events in Mogadishu.


2. Mohamed Farrah Aidid wasn't on our radar.


Aidid was strictly a local warlord, a guy with zero international ambitions. He was wreaking chaos in Somalia, and removing him was supposed to be a simple operation. Imagine this: What if American troops were sent into Los Angeles at the height of the crack epidemic to remove Freeway Rick Ross and were pinned down in the crossfire of a Bloods vs. Crips gang war?

Aidid was just a local thug who managed to find the vulnerability in the vaunted Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter.


3. "Black Hawk Down" was the first war movie released after 9/11.


It was also the last war movie made before the start of the War on Terror. As Eric Bana pointed out in our interview, the military gave the filmmakers access to gear in a way that would have been impossible just a few months later.

As Americans were processing the fallout of an attack on American soil, "Black Hawk Down" showed U.S. troops regrouping and showing strength and heroism after another surprise attack.  Read All!  




Joseph Allen “Joey” Ashley Memorial Highway

(Don Mac Smith Sends)


Dan Ashley Sr

Thank You New Franklin for honoring my son Joseph.

FRANKLIN, OHIO— The city is designating West Nimisila Road  between South Main Street and state Route 93 as the Joseph Allen “Joey” Ashley Memorial Highway to honor the U.S. Navy machinist 2nd class who died in a submarine accident in 2005.  


Ashley, a 1999 graduate of Manchester High School, lived on the stretch  of road when he enlisted in the Navy in 2001. The 24-year-old sailor was on the nuclear submarine USS San Francisco on Jan. 9 when it struck an undersea mountain in the western Pacific.

He was thrown 20 feet, striking his head on a large metal pump. He lost consciousness and died the next day. Sixty other sailors were injured but Ashley was the only one who died.

Mayor Paul Adamson will dedicate the Memorial Highway signs May 27 during a ceremony at the Manchester Cemetery, 1030 W. Nimisila Road. The ceremony will follow the New Franklin Memorial Day Parade, which kicks off at 9 a.m. at the Grace Bible Church on Manchester Road and travels to the cemetery. Ashley’s mother Vicki Matics will serve as the
grand marshal at the parade.

Ben Ashley, Ashley’s brother and a warrant officer in the U.S. Army, will speak on behalf of the family at the dedication ceremony. Ashley’s  father Dan, brother Danny, and three sisters Melissa, Vickie, and Stephanie, as well as extended family members, will be in attendance.


On Eternal Patrol - The Loss of USS Lagarto (SS-371)


Compiled by Paul W. Wittmer and Charles R. Hinman, originally from:

U.S. Submarine Losses World War II, NAVPERS 15,784, 1949 ISSUE

LAGARTO, under CDR F. D. Latta, departed Subic Bay, P. I., on 12 April1945, for her second patrol in the South China Sea. On 27 April, she was directed to the outer part of Siam Gulf.

LAGARTO contacted BAYA, already patrolling in Siam Gulf on 2 May 1945,and exchanged calls with her by SJ radar. Later that day BAYA sent LAGARTO a contact report on a convoy she had contacted consisting of one tanker, one auxiliary and two destroyers. LAGARTO soon reported being in contact with the convoy, and began coming in for an attack with BAYA.  However the enemy escorts were equipped with 10 cm radar, and detected BAYA and drove her off with gunfire, whereupon the two submarines decided to wait and plan a subsequent attack.

Early on the morning of 3 May 1945, LAGARTO and BAYA made a rendezvous atabout 7° 55'N, 102° 18'E and discussed plans. LAGARTO was to dive on the convoy's track to make a contact at1400, while BAYA was to be ten to fifteen miles further along the track.  During the day, numerous contact reports were exchanged. At 0010 on 4 May after a prolonged but unsuccessful attack, BAYA was finally driven off by the alert escorts, and no further contact of any kind was ever made with LAGARTO.

Japanese information now available records an attack on a U. S. submarine made by the minelayer HATSUTAKA, believed to be one of the two radar-equipped escorts of the convoy attacked. The attack was made at 7° 55'N, 102° 00'E in about 30 fathoms of water, and in view of the information presented above, the attack here described must be presumed to be the one which sank LAGARTO.  Read all  




Carrier Lincoln Enters Red Sea After Speeding Up Transit to Middle East


A Navy carrier strike group has entered the waters around the Middle East, four days after U.S. officials announced they were dispatching a show of military strength to the region in response to threats from Iran.

The Abraham Lincoln Strike Group transited the Suez Canal on Thursday, passing from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea through the 120-mile channel, Navy officials announced.

The Lincoln, which deployed in late March from its Norfolk, Virginia, homeport, brings with it the Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruiser Leyte Gulf and the Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer Bainbridge, as well as a Spanish frigate, the Mendez Nunez.

"[The Lincoln Strike Group] has been conducting operations in the U.S. 6th Fleet area of operations for several weeks, but expedited their transit to U.S. Central Command to protect U.S. forces and interests in the region," Navy officials said in a statement. "[The strike group] will be positioned by CENTCOM where it will be best able to protect U.S. forces and interests in the region and to deter any aggression.

National Security Adviser John Bolton released a statement May 5 announcing that the U.S. was "deploying" the Lincoln Carrier Strike Group, along with a task force of B-52 bombers, to CENTCOM to "send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force."

Officials have not clarified the nature of the perceived threat, but the move does come amid ramped-up tensions between the U.S. and the Iranian regime.


President Donald Trump last year withdrew the U.S. from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, an agreement limiting Iran's ability to acquire and develop nuclear weapons, after asserting many times that it was a bad-faith deal.


Last month, the U.S. took the unprecedented step of designated Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps a foreign terrorist organization, a move that Trump said "recognizes the reality" that Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism.


The Iranian government promised retaliation, and responded within days by passing a measure labeling all U.S. military forces as terrorist.


The Lincoln Strike Group joins the Navy's Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group in the Middle East. The Kearsarge was previously positioned in the Persian Gulf as part of routine deployed operations.


It's not clear how much faster the Lincoln, which had always been bound for the Middle East, arrived in the region. While in the 6th Fleet and en route to the Red Sea, the Lincoln hosted NATO representatives from nations including Finland, Germany, Greece, the Kingdom of Denmark, Poland, the Republic of Bulgaria, Spain and the United Kingdom on May 7, according to a military news release.


"Our Navy exists to deter conflict, ensure freedom of the seas, preserve our strategic interests and those of our allies, and respond to crises around the world," Rear Adm. John Wade, commander of the strike group, said in a statement. "We have trained hard and worked diligently to ensure we are prepared and ready to conduct a whole host of missions wherever and whenever required."



Who is Patrick Shanahan?

Posted May 11, 2019 


Retired U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Richard Newton says Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan will support President Trump's agenda to secure the southern border. ( 





Chelsea Manning says she'll never testify, seeks release

Associated Press

ALEXANDRIA, Va. – Former Army intelligence analyst Chelsea Manning is offering a new legal argument in her effort to be released from a Virginia jail.

Manning has been jailed in Alexandria for two months for refusing to testify to a grand jury investigating the website Wikileaks. She appealed her incarceration to the federal appeals court in Richmond, but a three-judge panel unanimously rejected her appeal last month.

In a motion filed Monday in Alexandria, Manning argues she has proven she'll stick to her principles and should therefore be released. Federal law only allows a recalcitrant witness to be jailed on civil contempt if there's a chance that the incarceration will coerce the witness into testifying.

Manning served seven years in a military prison for leaking a trove of documents to Wikileak.




How to Tick Off Your Golf Opponent

Posted May 7, 2019 




USS Squalus (SS-192): The Sinking, Rescue of Survivors, and Subsequent Salvage, 1939


Diving in the US Navy: A Brief History
The Sinking and Recovery of the USS Squalus (produced by the Office of Naval Research for students and teachers)

 bmarine built at the Portsmouth Navy Yard, Portsmouth, New Hampshire and commissioned there on 1 March 1939, suffered a catastrophic valve failure during a test dive off the Isle of Shoals at 0740 on 23 May. Partially flooded, the submarine sank to the bottom and came to rest keel down in 40 fathoms (240 feet) of water. Navy divers and salvage ships responded quickly, and the following day began operations to rescue the surviving 32 crew members and one civilian from the forward sections of the boat. At 1130 on 24 May, USS Falcon (ASR-2) lowered the newly developed McCann rescue chamber--a revised version of a diving bell invented by Commander Charles B. Momsen--and, over the next 13 hours, all 33 survivors were rescued from the stricken submarine. On 13 September, after long and difficult salvage operations, Squalus was raised and towed into the Portsmouth Navy Yard. The boat was formally decommissioned on 15 November, renamed Sailfish on 9 February 1940, and recommissioned on 15 May 1940


Published: Mon Aug 15 08:08:01 EDT 2016




Man's Universal Weakness

Posted May 6, 2019  VID-20141015-WA00171.mp4

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